This report describes the rationale, approaches, organization, and resource development leading to a large-scale deletion bin map of the hexaploid wheat genome. Accompanying reports in this issue detail results from chromosome bin-mapping of expressed sequence tags representing genes onto the seven homoeologous chromosome groups and a global analysis of the entire mapped wheat EST data set. Among the resources developed were the first extensive public wheat EST collection. Described are protocols for sequencing, sequence processing, EST nomenclature, and the assembly of (...) ESTs into contigs. These contigs plus singletons were used for selection of distinct sequence motif unigenes. Selected ESTs were rearrayed, validated by 5′ and 3′ sequencing, and amplified for probing a series of wheat aneuploid and deletion stocks. Images and data for all Southern hybridizations were deposited in databases and were used by the coordinators for each of the seven homoeologous chromosome groups to validate the mapping results. Results from this project have established the foundation for future developments in wheat genomics. (shrink)

Çalışmanın temel amacı, farklı aile yapısına sahip olan hanelerde kadının, aile içerisindeki rolünün çalışma süresine etkisini incelemektir. Kadınların farklı aile yapılarında farklı sorumlulukları olmasına rağmen, hangi aile yapısında olursa olsun kadının aile içerisinde ortak kabul edilen sorumluluklara sahip olduğu söylenebilir. Bu yüzden aile içerisindeki kadınların çalışma sürelerini ve sonrasında elde edilen bulguları incelenmek önem arz etmektedir. Çalışmamızda yöntem olarak Poisson regresyon modeli kullanılmıştır. Araştırılan deneyde bağımlı değişken değerleri 0, 1, 2, … gibi tamsayı değerlerini alıyorsa incelenen model Poisson regresyon modelidir. (...) Analizde, ailede hane halkı sorumlusunun eşi olan ve hane halkı sorumlusu olan kadınların çalışma süresine etkisi ayrı ayrı incelenmiştir. Elde edilen sonuçlara göre, kadının hane halkı sorumlusunun eşi olduğu durumlarda çocuksuz çiftlere göre çocuklu ailelerde haftalık çalışma süresini negatif etkilediği ve çalışma süresinin 0,83 kat azalma olasılığı elde edilmiştir. Kadının hane halkı sorumlusu olduğu durumlarda ise, tek yetişkinli ailelere göre çocuklu ailelerde kadının çalışma süresini pozitif etkilemekte ve çalışma süresinin 2,99 kat daha fazla olma ihtimali tespit edilmiştir. Kadının hane halkı sorumlusunun eşi olduğu ve hane halkı sorumlusu olduğu durumlarda da 0-6 yaş arası bağımlı çocuk sahibi olmanın katsayısı %1 seviyesinde istatistiksel olarak anlamlı bulunmuş ve kadının çalışma süresini negatif etkilediği görülmüştür. Kadının gerek hane sorumlusunun eşi, gerekse de hane sorumlusunun kendisi olduğu durumlarda, çalışma karşılığı gelir değişkeni kadının çalışma süresini pozitif etkilerken, çalışma dışı gelir değişkeninin ise negatif etkilediği tespit edilmiştir. Meslekler ve toplam çalışma hayatı süresi değişkenlerinin katsayılarının ise birçok değişkende anlamlı çıktığı görülmüştür. Çalışmada incelenen veriler Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu (TÜİK)’ndan elde edilen tüm ülkeyi kapsayan veriler olduğu için çalışmanın bulguları önemli görülmedir. İncelenen literatür sonucunda Türkiye’de farklı aile yapılarının, kadınların çalışma süresine etkisini inceleyen herhangi bir çalışmaya rastlanmamış olması da çalışmanın literatüre önemli katkı yapacağı yönündedir. (shrink)

Doubtless, the conscious brain integrates masses of information. But declaring that consciousness simply “emerges” when enough has accumulated, doesn't really explain how first person experience is implemented by neurons. Moreover, empirical observations challenge integrated information theory's (IIT) reliance on thalamo–cortical interactions as the information integrator. More likely, the cortex streams processed information to a still-enigmatic consciousness generator, one perhaps located in the brainstem.

Evidence that central sensitization needs to be maintained in an ongoing manner by nociceptive input from the periphery makes the peripheral drive, rather than the central amplification process, the highest priority target for understanding and control. To stop the peripheral drives to kill two birds with one stone. Moreover, the amplification that central sensitization does provide is selective and not necessarily striking in intensity. A that neutralized central sensitization would probably be less effective in controlling persistent pain than many investigators (...) would like to believe. [berkley; blumberg et al.; coderre & katz; dickenson; mcmahon; weisenfeld-hallin et al.]. (shrink)

Painful stimuli evoke functional activations in the cortex, but electrical stimulation of these areas does not evoke pain sensation, nor does widespread epileptic discharge. Likewise, cortical lesions do not eliminate pain sensation. Although the cortex may contribute to pain modulation, the planning of escape responses, and learning, the network activity that constitutes the actual experience of pain probably occurs subcortically. (Published Online May 1 2007).

This is a personal development book that teaches a powerful tool for self-inquiry embodied through a practice of yoga. This book solves the problem of feeling stuck, lost, or confused. The solution is a powerful inner navigation technique that will help readers find their way.

C. S. Lewis's A Grief Observed remains one of the most popular and highly recommended books on grief for bereaved people, and yet some of the experiences Lewis recounts strike readers as distinctive and unfamiliar. In this paper I draw attention to these distinctive, less familiar experiences, and make sense of them in the light of Lewis's theology. In so doing, I provide one example of how a person's worldview can shape their experience — in this case, how the phenomenology (...) of grief is infused by the person's conceptual world. At the end, I point to some of the practical (pastoral and clinical) implications of my analysis, and also to some implications about our understanding of the nature of grief. (shrink)

Psychiatric literature about when instances of voice hearing should be regarded as religiously inflected psychopathology and when they should be regarded as religious experiences sometimes presupposes that a person’s experience can only be either psychopathological, or else a genuine religious experience. In this paper I will consider an alternative: the possibility of a both–and account. A both–and account might involve the idea that a religious experience causes psychopathology, or is psychopathology, or that people open to religious experiences may also be (...) susceptible to psychopathology. After arguing that these are either problematic or under-evidenced, I will argue for another version of a both–and account: that genuine religious experience can arise out of situations involving psychopathology. I will also point to some of the clinical and pastoral implications of my view. (shrink)

Medical assistance in dying, which includes voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide, is legally permissible in a number of jurisdictions, including the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland and Canada. Although medical assistance in dying is most commonly provided for suffering associated with terminal somatic illness, some jurisdictions have also offered it for severe and irremediable psychiatric illness. Meanwhile, recent work in the philosophy of psychiatry has led to a renewed understanding of psychiatric illness that emphasises the role of the relation between the person (...) and the external environment in the constitution of mental disorder. In this paper, I argue that this externalist approach to mental disorder highlights an ethical challenge to the practice of medical assistance in dying for psychiatric illness. At the level of the clinical assessment, externalism draws attention to potential social and environmental interventions that might have otherwise been overlooked by the standard approach to mental disorder, which may confound the judgement that there is no further reasonable alternative that could alleviate the person’s suffering. At the level of the wider society, externalism underscores how social prejudices and structural barriers that contribute to psychiatric illness constrain the affordances available to people and result in them seeking medical assistance in dying when they otherwise might not have had under better social conditions. (shrink)

En reseña de:MULCAHY, Linda, Legal architecture. Justice, due process and the place of law. Editorial Routledge. Londres, 2011.

What would you think if someone told you they heard voices when no one was there, or could sense the presence of the dead? In some historical periods and in some societies today these experiences are made sense of positively in religious or spiritual terms, but in modern western societies they tend to be regarded as symptomatic of mental illnesses such as schizophrenia. I argue that interpreting these experiences in terms of illness can negatively affect them, turning them into something (...) pathological when they needn't necessarily be so. I also discuss wider issues regarding illness, medicine, authority, interpretation and meaning.Export citation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Deepening and Expanding Both–And ApproachesTasia Scrutton, PhDExcitingly for the topic of religion and mental health, both Gipps’ and Finley’s commentaries point to the emergence of a both-and consensus. Finley does this in a number of ways, for example by pointing to the ways in which her own brilliant research has provided further and more specific support for a “honeysuckle on a broken fence” model, and also inviting a renewed (...) examination of Model 3 in response to studies on absorption, psychosis and religious experience. Gipps does this by putting forward an additional both-and model, according to which a potential or early-stage instance of mental illness, responded to by a grace-ful engagement with psychotherapy, becomes instead an instance of metanoia through which the person’s drives and emotions are integrated into a more rounded adult psyche.As well as pointing to the emergence of a both-and consensus, Finley and Gipps’ commentaries importantly reflect the fact that both-and accounts are likely to be diverse, complex and multi-faceted. As Gipps notes, my account focuses on spiritual guidance and medication, especially psychiatric medication; the therapeutically informed psychological perspective that Gipps provides is a very welcome addition to the discussion. In addition to both-and accounts being diverse, different psychiatric conditions and symptoms may invite different models, and multiple models may be in play in one person’s life at the same time. Finley gives an example of this possibility when she posits that a version of model 3 might fruitfully by understood as part of, or perhaps combined with, Model 4.Hopefully this paper and the two commentaries on it open the door to a deeper account of the “honeysuckle on a broken fence” model and potentially to other both-and models too. I want to see that door open—but perhaps not too open, and I think less open certainly than Finley and perhaps also Gipps would like. This is because of my view of the relationship between suffering and psychopathology, and suffering and evil (or badness), which I want to discuss in more detail below.Suffering, Badness, and PathologyThe first thing I want to say is that I think that suffering is bad, by which I mean that it is undesirable. This is true to the way we talk about suffering (if someone tells us that they are suffering, we express regret, not joy), and it is important [End Page 265] morally to remember that suffering is an evil if we are to work to prevent and overcome it (including in ways relevant to mental illness, such as through social justice, peace-building and medical care). It can be tempting to romanticize suffering and to try to justify its romanticization on the basis that sometimes good things come out of situations of suffering. However, to do this is to conflate what something is with other things it may become intertwined with. It is also to encourage masochistic and socially and politically conservative forms of spirituality that are antithetical to the Christian Gospel, since it baptizes suffering rather than seeing suffering as something people are called to be liberated from.The second thing I want to say is that I think that pathology, including psychopathology, involves suffering, and that if it does not involve suffering (either in a specific moment or over time) then it is not pathology. The centrality of suffering to pathology is indicated by the fact that the term ‘distress,’ which denotes suffering, appears in the DSM-5 618 times. The presence of either distress or impairment in social, occupational or important other areas of functioning (which, over time, is likely to lead to suffering) is a prerequisite of many psychiatric conditions, according to DSM-5. Homosexuality was rightly removed from the DSM and other psychiatric manuals when it became clear that same-sex attraction does not inherently involve distress (and so suffering). Significant for the shift towards demythologizing homosexuality was Evelyn Hooker’s 1957 study, which showed no similarities in the well-being and happiness of 30 homosexual and 30 heterosexual men (Ebacioni, 2014, p. 4). To take another example, hearing voices (with no... (shrink)

En reseña de:Costa Wegsman, Malena, Feminismos Jurídicos, Ediciones Didot, Argentina, 2016.

Gender affirming hormone treatment is an important part of the care of trans adolescents which enables them to develop the secondary sexual characteristics congruent with their identified genders. There is an increasing amount of empirical evidence showing the benefits of gender affirming hormone treatment for psychological health and social well-being in this population. However, in several countries, access to gender affirming hormone treatment for trans adolescents has recently been severely restricted. While much of the opposition to gender affirming hormone treatment (...) for trans adolescents has in part been ideologically motivated, it also reflects a debate about whether there are harms that outweigh the benefits of the treatment. Accordingly, a systematic and comprehensive philosophical analysis of the ethics of gender affirming hormone treatment for trans adolescents is needed. Herein, I offer such an analysis that draws on the four principles of biomedical ethics by Tom Beauchamp and James Childress. Based on the considerations of beneficence, nonmaleficence, autonomy, and justice, I argue that the provision of access to gender affirming hormone treatment for consenting trans adolescents is ethically required and that the current restrictions to such treatment are ethically wrong. (shrink)

This paper offers a philosophical analysis of the connection between mental disorder and suicide risk. In contemporary psychiatry, it is commonly suggested that this connection is a causal connection that has been established through empirical discovery. Herein, I examine the extent to which this claim can be sustained. I argue that the connection between mental disorder and increased suicide risk is not wholly causal but is partly conceptual. This in part relates to the way suicidality is built into the definitions (...) of some psychiatric diagnoses. It also relates to the broader normative assumption that suicidal behavior is by definition mentally disordered behavior. The above has significant epistemological implications, which I explore. I propose that the claim that suicide is connected with mental disorder cannot be justified solely by appealing to empirical evidence but also warrants a justification on conceptual and normative grounds. (shrink)

In The Biopsychosocial Model of Health and Disease, Derek Bolton and Grant Gillett argue that a defensible updated version of the biopsychosocial model requires a metaphysically adequate account of disease causation that can accommodate biological, psychological, and social factors. This present paper offers a philosophical critique of their account of biopsychosocial causation. I argue that their account relies on claims about the normativity and the semantic content of biological information that are metaphysically contentious. Moreover, I suggest that these claims are (...) unnecessary for a defence of biopsychosocial causation, as the roles of multiple and diverse factors in disease causation can be readily accommodated by a more widely accepted and less metaphysically contentious account of causation. I then raise the more general concern that they are misdiagnosing the problem with the traditional version of the biopsychosocial model. The challenge when developing an explanatorily valuable version of the biopsychosocial model, I argue, is not so much providing an adequate account of biopsychosocial causation, but providing an adequate account of causal selection. Finally, I consider how this problem may be solved to arrive at a more explanatorily valuable and clinically useful version of the biopsychosocial model. (shrink)

Claims about whether or not infertility is a disease are sometimes invoked to defend or criticize the provision of state-funded treatment for infertility. In this paper, I suggest that this strategy is problematic. By exploring infertility through key approaches to disease in the philosophy of medicine, I show that there are deep theoretical disagreements regarding what subtypes of infertility qualify as diseases. Given that infertility's disease status remains unclear, one cannot uncontroversially justify or undermine its claim to medical treatment by (...) claiming that it is or is not a disease. Instead of focusing on disease status, a preferable strategy to approach the debate about state-funded treatment is to explicitly address the specific ethical considerations raised by infertility. I show how this alternative strategy can be supported by a recent theoretical framework in the philosophy of medicine, which avoids the problems associated with the concepts of health and disease. (shrink)

In clinical medicine, a diagnosis can offer an explanation of a patient's symptoms by specifying the pathology that is causing them. Diagnoses in psychiatry are also sometimes presented in clinical texts as if they pick out pathological processes that cause sets of symptoms. However, current evidence suggests the possibility that many diagnostic categories in psychiatry are highly causally heterogeneous. For example, major depressive disorder may not be associated with a single type of underlying pathological process, but with a range of (...) different causal pathways, each involving complex interactions of various biological, psychological, and social factors. This paper explores the implications of causal heterogeneity for whether psychiatric diagnoses can be said to serve causal explanatory roles in clinical practice. I argue that while they may fall short of picking out a specific cause of the patient's symptoms, they can nonetheless supply different sorts of clinically relevant causal information. In particular, I suggest that some psychiatric diagnoses provide negative information that rules out certain causes, some provide approximate or disjunctive information about the range of possible causal processes, and some provide causal information about the relations between the symptoms themselves. (shrink)

It is often claimed in parts of the psychiatric literature that neuroscientific research into the biological basis of mental disorder undermines dualism in the philosophy of mind. This paper shows that such a claim does not apply to all forms of dualism. Focusing on Kenneth Kendler’s discussion of the mind–body problem in biological psychiatry, I argue that such criticism of dualism often conflates the psychological and phenomenal concepts of the mental. Moreover, it fails to acknowledge that there are different varieties (...) of dualism, and so overlooks the important metaphysical insights of contemporary dualist philosophers. I argue that while the neuroscientific research underpinning biological psychiatry challenges the traditional dualism of René Descartes, it does not pose any problem for the more modern dualism of David Chalmers. It is possible to take seriously the scientific claims of biological psychiatry while holding that this latter form of dualism is true. This has implications for the positioning of the mind–body problem in psychiatry. While the “easy” problem of explaining psychological processes is relevant to the aims of biological psychiatry, psychiatrists need not worry about the “hard” problem of consciousness. (shrink)

In contemporary philosophy of mind, the conceivability argument against physicalism is often used to support a form of dualism, which takes consciousness to be ontologically fundamental and distinct from physical matter. Recently, some proponents of the conceivability argument have also shown interest in panpsychism, which is the view that mentality is ubiquitous in the natural world. This paper examines the extent to which panpsychism can be sustained if the conceivability argument is taken seriously. I argue that panpsychism’s ubiquity claim permits (...) a strong reading or a weak reading. This presents a dilemma. On the one hand, the strong reading, which is typically characterised as a form of monism, is undermined by the conceivability argument. On the other hand, the weak reading, while compatible with the conceivability argument, turns out just to be a special case of dualism. I also show that the related position of panprotopsychism cannot provide a tenable monist position because it too cannot withstand the challenge of the conceivability argument. Therefore, if the conceivability argument is taken seriously, then we are committed to a dualist metaphysics, regardless of whether or not we accept the ubiquity claim. (shrink)

In somatic medicine, diagnostic terms often refer to the disease processes that are the causes of patients' symptoms. The language used in some clinical textbooks and health information resources suggests that this is also sometimes assumed to be the case with diagnoses in psychiatry. However, this seems to be in tension with the ways in which psychiatric diagnoses are defined in diagnostic manuals, according to which they refer solely to clusters of symptoms. This paper explores how theories of reference in (...) the philosophy of language can help to resolve this tension. After the evaluation of descriptive and causal theories of reference, I put forward a conceptual framework based on two-dimensional semantics that allows the causal analysis of diagnostic terms in psychiatry, while taking seriously their descriptive definitions in diagnostic manuals. While the framework is presented as a solution to a problem regarding the semantics of psychiatric diagnoses, it can also accommodate the analysis of diagnostic terms in other medical disciplines. (shrink)

In the Netherlands and Belgium, it is lawful for voluntary euthanasia to be offered on the grounds of psychiatric suffering. A recent case that has sparked much debate is that of Aurelia Brouwers, who was helped to die in the Netherlands on account of her suffering from borderline personality disorder. It is sometimes claimed that whether or not a mentally ill person’s wish to die is valid hinges on whether or not that wish is a symptom of the person’s mental (...) disorder. This article addresses the philosophical problems raised by this claim, with a specific focus on the diagnosis of borderline personality disorder. After considering descriptivist and causal conceptualizations of mental disorder, I argue that the current approach to borderline personality disorder in psychiatry precludes the possibility of dissociating the wish to die from the disorder. I then examine the implications of this analysis for the question of whether or not the request for voluntary euthanasia in the case of borderline personality disorder can be considered valid. Ultimately, I conclude that the inability to dissociate the wish to die from the disorder does not invalidate the wish in the case of borderline personality disorder. (shrink)

Diagnoses are central to the practice of medicine, where they serve a variety of functions for clinicians, patients, and society. They aid communication, explain symptoms, inform predictions, guide therapeutic interventions, legitimize sickness, and authorize access to resources. Insofar as psychiatry is a discipline whose practice is shaped by medical conventions, its diagnoses are sometimes presented as if they serve the same sorts of function as diagnoses in bodily medicine. However, there are philosophical problems that cast doubt on whether the functions (...) of psychiatric diagnoses can legitimately be considered to be equivalent to those of medical diagnoses. The aim of this chapter is to explicate some of these problems, particularly conceptual and epistemological problems pertaining to the roles of diagnoses as explanations. I begin with an overview of the various functions that medical diagnoses normally serve and suggest that many of these functions receive justificatory support from the explanatory roles of the diagnoses. I then present issues regarding the epistemic functions of psychiatric diagnoses and how these issues have featured in the arguments of prominent critics of psychiatry. (shrink)

Evolutionary psychiatry suggests that mental disorders can be explained in evolutionary terms (a) as failures of psychological mechanisms to produce the adaptive effects for which they were naturally selected, (b) as mismatches between naturally selected psychological mechanisms and contemporary environmental pressures, or (c) as naturally selected psychological mechanisms whose effects continue to be adaptive. In this paper, I present a philosophical critique of evolutionary psychiatry that draws on Subrena Smith’s matching problem for evolutionary psychology. For evolutionary psychiatry hypotheses to be (...) empirically supported, proponents of evolutionary psychiatry must demonstrate (1) that the contemporary psychological mechanisms involved in mental disorders resemble the psychological mechanisms of our evolutionary ancestors, (2) that the contemporary psychological mechanisms are phylogenetically descended from the ancestral psychological mechanisms, and (3) that the ancestral psychological mechanisms were naturally selected because their effects had adaptive benefits. However, for many mental disorders, evolutionary psychiatry lacks the methodological resources to demonstrate these conditions. Therefore, many evolutionary psychiatry hypotheses are empirically untestable and remain indefinitely underdetermined by data. (shrink)

In a recent paper, I argued that an externalist understanding of mental disorder from the philosophy of psychiatry presents an ethical challenge to the practice of medical assistance in dying (MAiD) for psychiatric illness, because it highlights the ways in which the suffering associated with psychiatric illness is sustained by features of the external environment wherein the person is embedded, including social barriers and injustices. In a response to my paper, Harry Hudson argues that addressing social inequality lacks relevance to (...) the immediate permissibility of psychiatric MAiD and that the issue of psychiatric MAiD should be informed by ‘pragmatic politics’ rather than by ‘obfuscatory philosophy’. Herein, I contend that Hudson’s response misconstrues my position and ascribes to me views I neither express nor endorse. My paper does not claim that psychiatric MAiD should be denied to people who are presently in intolerable distress. Rather, it suggests that the provision of psychiatric MAiD comes along with social responsibilities of the state to attend to the barriers and injustices that sustain and exacerbate psychiatric illness, as well as ethical responsibilities of clinicians to consider a wider range of presently available psychological and social interventions which may have been neglected under a traditional internalist approach. (shrink)

Diagnoses in medicine are often taken to serve as explanations of patients’ symptoms and signs. This article examines how they do so. I begin by arguing that although some instances of diagnostic explanation can be formulated as covering law arguments, they are explanatory neither in virtue of their argumentative structures nor in virtue of general regularities between diagnoses and clinical presentations. I then consider the theory that medical diagnoses explain symptoms and signs by identifying their actual causes in particular cases. (...) While I take this to be largely correct, I argue that for a diagnosis to function as a satisfactory causal explanation of a patient’s symptoms and signs, it also needs to be supplemented by understanding the mechanisms by which the identified cause produces the symptoms and signs. This mechanistic understanding comes not from the diagnosis itself, but rather from the theoretical framework within which the physician operates. (shrink)

This paper addresses a philosophical problem concerning the ontological status of age classification. For various purposes, people are commonly classified into categories such as “young adulthood”, “middle adulthood”, and “older adulthood”, which are defined chronologically. These age categories prima facie seem to qualify as natural kinds under a homeostatic property cluster account of natural kindhood, insofar as they capture certain biological, psychological, and social properties of people that tend to cluster together due to causal processes. However, this is challenged by (...) the observation that age categories are historically unstable. The properties that age categories are supposed to capture are affected by healthcare and cultural developments, such that people are staying biologically, psychologically, and socially young for longer. Furthermore, the act of classifying people into age categories can bring about changes in their behaviors, which in turn alter the biological, psychological, and social properties that the categories are supposed to capture. Accordingly, I propose that age categories are best understood as interactive kinds that are influenced in dynamic ways by looping effects. I consider some implications of these looping effects for our classificatory practices concerning age, including how different disciplines may need to review the ways they define and use age categories in their inductive inferences. (shrink)

This paper examines the complex research landscape of contemporary suicidology from a philosophy of science perspective. I begin by unpacking the methods, concepts, and assumptions of some of the prominent approaches to studying suicide causation, including psychological autopsy studies, epidemiological studies, biological studies, and qualitative studies. I then analyze the different ways these approaches partition the causes of suicide, with particular emphasis on the ways they conceptualize the domain of mental disorder. I argue that these different ways of partitioning the (...) causal space and conceptualizing mental disorder result in incommensurabilities between the approaches. These incommensurabilities restrict the degrees to which the different approaches can be integrated, thus lending support to explanatory pluralism in the study of suicide causation. They also shed light on some of the philosophical underpinnings of the disagreement between mainstream suicidology and the emerging area of critical suicidology. (shrink)

The necessity of origin suggests that a person’s identity is determined by the particular pair of gametes from which the person originated. An implication is that speculative scenarios concerning how we might otherwise have been had our gametic origins been different are dismissed as being metaphysically impossible. Given, however, that many of these speculations are intelligible and commonplace in the discourses of competent speakers, it is overhasty to dismiss them as mistakes. This paper offers a way of understanding these speculations (...) that does not commit them to incoherence but aims to make the best sense of what they are expressing. Using the philosophical framework of two‐dimensional semantics, it proposes that the speculative scenarios are best analysed as epistemic possibilities, rather than as metaphysical possibilities. It then explores some implications of this analysis for the ethical challenges associated with the non‐identity problem. (shrink)

Assisted reproduction using donor gametes is a procedure that allows those who are unable to produce their own gametes to achieve gestational parenthood. Where conception is achieved using donor sperm, the child lacks a genetic link to the intended father. Where it is achieved using a donor egg, the child lacks a genetic link to the intended mother. To address this lack of genetic kinship, some fertility clinics engage in the practice of matching the ethnicity of the gamete donor to (...) that of the recipient parent. The intended result is for the child to have the phenotypic characteristics of the recipient parents. This paper examines the philosophical and ethical problems raised by the policy of ethnic matching in gamete donation. I consider arguments for the provision of ethnic matching based on maximising physical resemblance and fostering ethnic identity development. I then consider an argument against ethnic matching based on the charge of racialism. I conclude that while the practice of ethnic matching in gamete donation could promote positive ethnic identity development in donor-conceived children from historically subjugated ethnic minorities, it also risks endorsing the problematic societal attitudes and assumptions regarding ethnicity that enabled such subjugation in the first place. (shrink)

Illusionism is the view that conscious experience is some sort of introspective illusion. According to illusionism, there is no conscious experience, but it merely seems like there is conscious experience. This would suggest that much phenomenological enquiry, including work on phenomenological psychopathology, rests on a mistake. Some philosophers have argued that illusionism is obviously false, because seeming is itself an experiential state, and so necessarily presupposes the reality of conscious experience. In response, the illusionist could suggest that the relevant sort (...) of seeming here is not an experiential state, but is a cognitive state, such as a judgement or a belief, which is fully amenable to a physical or functionalist analysis. Herein, I argue that this response is unsuccessful and fails to undermine the reality of conscious experience. Nonetheless, the response does raise the problem of how a judgement or belief about the character of a conscious experience, even if it is true, can be justified if the conscious experience has no causal role in the formation of the judgement or belief. This is not a new problem, but is a reiteration of an old problem that is known in the philosophy of mind literature as the paradox of phenomenal judgement. I consider how the paradox of phenomenal judgement can be resolved and how the judgement or belief about conscious experience can be justified with appeal to the notion of acquaintance. (shrink)

In the political discourse regarding gender identity, the concept of biological sex has been weaponised by gender critical commentators to oppose gender affirmation for trans people. Recently, these commentators have appealed to an essentialist model of sex based on anisogamy, or relative gamete size, to argue that one’s sex is an immutable characteristic. I argue that the gender critical argument is unsound. The diverse purposes of sex classification and the complex variability of people’s sexual characteristics show that an essentialist model (...) is untenable. I then consider how a more adequate theoretical framework from the philosophy of biology can accommodate this complexity and capture how sex is classified in relevant contexts. Further implications of the framework are explored which concern the vagueness, polysemy, and mutability of sex. These undercut the gender critical argument and show that the appeal to biological sex fails to undermine gender affirmation for trans people. (shrink)

In the philosophical literature on consciousness and the mind-body problem, the conceivability argument against physicalism is usually taken to support a form of dualism between physicality and phenomenality. Usually, the discussion focuses on the qualitative character of experience, which is what the phenomenal feel of a given experience is like. By contrast, the subjective character of experience, or its individuation to a given first-person subject, tends to be set aside. The aim of this paper is to present a new and (...) more robust version of the conceivability argument for dualism that appeals to the subjective character of experience. Drawing on insights by philosophers in the phenomenological tradition, I conceptualise the first-person subjective character of experience as a transcendental condition of possibility for phenomenality that cannot be reduced to third-person facts about the physical world. Given this, the mind-body problem as it pertains to consciousness does not merely concern the inability of the set of physical facts about a brain state to capture the qualitative character of experience, but concerns the existential issue of why this brain state is accompanied by first-person subjectivity at all. This allows us to reconceive the conceivability argument in a way that presents a stronger case for dualism than the traditional version of the argument. (shrink)

It is widely assumed that there is value in the biological tie between parent and child. An implication of this is that adoption is often considered a less desirable alternative to procreation. This paper offers a philosophical defence of adoptive parenthood as a valuable and authentic form of parenthood. While previous defences have suggested that society’s valorisation of the biological tie is unjustified, I argue herein that the conception of the biological tie that features in the normative discourse on parenthood (...) is too narrowly genocentric. Against this genocentric conception, recent work in the philosophy of biology has emphasised the roles of joint determination, dynamic construction, and extended inheritance in development, which I suggest can substantiate a more inclusive conception of the biological tie. Accordingly, I propose that adoptive parents form a rich variety of biological ties with their children, some of which are as heritable and formative as genetic relatedness. (shrink)

Some transgender and nonbinary people undergo phalloplasty and/or metoidioplasty as part of their medical transition process. Across surgical disciplines, a variety of resources are used to assist patients who are preparing for surgeries, including educational materials, workshops, peer support, and lifestyle changes. For gender-affirming surgeries, patients undergoing assessments to discern whether they are ready to undergo the surgery, and to assist them in achieving preparedness when needed. Little research investigates what resources are useful in helping patients to feel prepared to (...) undergo phalloplasty or metoidioplasty, and how assessments and resources can promote patient autonomy in the process. Respect for patient autonomy is one of the central tenets of ethical healthcare, yet historically, scholarship related to pre-surgical assessments for gender-affirming surgery has focused determining the ideal surgical candidate rather than respecting patient autonomy and ascertaining individual patient needs. This study sought to fill this gap by utilizing data from PROGRESS (Patient-Reported Outcomes of Genital Reconstruction and Experiences of Surgical Satisfaction), a cross-sectional, community-based survey of trans and nonbinary adults from the United States of America and Canada who had undergone one or more of these surgeries. Results revealed most participants (86%, n = 186) felt prepared to undergo surgery, though the majority of our sample (53%, n = 105) did not find referral letter assessments to be helpful. Peer support such as online resources/blogs were rated as highly useful, along with surgical consults. In a multivariable logistic regression, higher perceived preparedness was associated with identifying as queer (inclusive of gay, bi and pansexual compared to being straight), and feeling that one’s assessment process was useful (as opposed to not useful). Type of assessment was not significantly associated with preparedness; therefore, what is most useful when preparing for surgery may vary across individuals. Healthcare professionals who interact with preparing patients should develop new or utilize existing resources to assist patients in identifying their preparation needs and achieving preparedness. Our data supports assessments that center surgical care planning rather than assessing level of gender dysphoria. Future longitudinal research could further refine which assessment processes are most effective in helping patients who are preparing for these surgeries. Assessments should ensure that patients are appropriately prepared to undergo and recover from surgery through a robust process of informed consent. (shrink)